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PROOF OF DESERTION THROUGH PROLONGED
ABSENCE
Alfred Avinst
I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent case of United States v. Cothern the United States Court
of Military Appeals rejected what many authorities had considered a
well-settled and basic rule of the law of desertion-the rule that where
there is a prolonged absence which is unexplained "the court will be
justified in inferring from that alone an intent to remain absent per-
manently."' The decision has been widely followed and commented
upon. This article examines the historical origins of, and the justification
for, the rule of prolonged absence.
Article 858 the Uniform Code of Military Justice denounces one of
the oldest of military offenses, desertion. In addition to being an ancient
crime, it is also a popular one.4 Section a(1) describes the offense of
"straight" desertion, which originally was the only way in which desertion
could be committed. It describes as a deserter one who "without proper
authority goes or remains absent from his place of service, organization,
or place of duty with intent to remain away therefrom permanently."
The problem typically presented in desertion cases to the prosecution is,
how can the necessary intent to desert be proved?
The Manual for Courts-Martial5 devotes one paragraph to this problem
of how an intent to desert may be proved. The first part of the paragraph
lists various indicia by which one may infer an intent to desert; the
latter part lists indicia by which the intent may be negatived. It is signifi-
cant that the first sentence of the paragraph is this: "If the condition of
absence without proper authority is much prolonged and there is no satis-
factory explanation of it, the court will be justified in inferring from that
alone an intent to remain absent permanently." 7 From the decided cases,
it can be seen that the key word in this rule is "prolonged."
The purpose of this article is to examine the prolonged absence rule
in light of its history, its importance, its relation to other indicia by
which an intent to desert may be found, and its present status as de-
t See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 394, for biographical data.
1 8 USCMA 158, 23 CMR 382 (1957).
2 Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S. Army, 1951, 164, at 313.
3 10 U.S.C. § 885 (1958).
- See Avins, The Law of AWOL 33 (1957), and the authorities cited therein.
5 Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, Executive Order 10214.
6 Id. 164a, at 313.
7 Ibid.
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termined by recent decisions of the United States Court of Military
Appeals. Some forecast will be attempted as to its place in the future
development of the military law.
While, of course, the offense of desertion consists of two elements,
absence without leave and intent to remain away permanently, the first
of these will not be discussed. The author has already devoted an entire
book to the subject," and there would be no point in duplicating any of
it here. It is therefore assumed in all of the cases under discussion that
the length of the absence without leave was as found by the court. Nor
will there be any discussion of the nature and quality of the intent which
distinguishes desertion from absence without leave. The author has
already detailed this,9 and in this article, when the intent to desert is
discussed, it will be assumed that the reader is familiar with the type of
intent required to sustain the offense of desertion.
The importance of the subject of this article and the necessity for a
review of this area of the military law was suggested to the author by
several reviewers of his book.10 It seems that this area of the military
law is of sufficient importance in itself, and sufficiently different from
absence without leave, to warrant a separate study.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE RULE
While the offense of desertion is very old, the earliest textwriters on
military law in England, in mentioning and describing the offense, do
not detail the manner in which the all-important animus non revertendi
is to be proved.'1 There is, in fact, no authoritative comment upon this
point for almost a half century after the American Revolution. Never-
theless, the general acceptance of the rule of prolonged absence during
this period can be deduced from two facts, namely, that it was con-
sidered well-settled by later authority, which will be gone into below,
8 Avins, op. cit. supra note 4.
9 Id. at 39, 130, 134, and 135.
10 In Brannon, "Review of Avins, The Law of AWOL," 44 Va. L. Rev. 155, 156 (1958),
Major General Eugene M. Bannon, former Judge Advocate General of the Army said:
The book would be more useful if the author had included the subject of desertion,
which is so closely related to AWOL that much of the discussion would be applicable
to both. A thorough study of this offense is especially necessary in light of recent
decisions of the Court of Military Appeals concerning the inferences to be drawn
from a prolonged and unexplained absence. The law in this field is in a state of
great confusion.
To the same effect, see Everett, Review, 10 J. Legal Ed. 557, 559 (1958); Gaynor, Review,
Army, July 1958, p. 79; Mickelwait, "Review of Avins, The Law of AWOL," 45 Calif.
L. Rev. 561 (1957); Peck, Review, 31 So. Cal. L. Rev. 218 (1958); Wurfel, Review, 33
Notre Dame Law. 659, 660 (1958).
11 The point is not discussed in Tytler, Essay on Military Law (1806) or McArthur,
Naval and Military Courts-Martial (4th ed. 1813).
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and that it was the rule in the maritime law of the United States and
England.
In the early history of the United States, military and naval law had
a close affinity to the maritime law, a point noticed by Winthrop."2 In
respect to the maritime law, undoubtedly the leading authority in the
early days of the Republic was the justly celebrated Mr. Justice Story.
That eminent jurist, whose decisions laid the foundation for American
maritime law, had this to say in reference to a statute in Cloutmcrn v.
Tunison:'3
It treats absence, therefore, without leave, to be an equivocal act, and
not necessarily desertion, animo nn revertendi. But, inasmuch as such
prolonged absence might endanger the safety of the ship, or the due
progress of the voyage, it deems forty-eight hours' absence without leave,
to be ipso facto a desertion .... It thus creates a statute desertion, and
makes that conclusive evidence of the fact, which would, upon the common
principles of the maritime law, be merely presumptive evidence of it.14
In considering the weight to be given to the above case, it must be
remembered that this was the first American case in which the rule that
a prolonged absence is presumptive evidence of intent to desert was ex-
pressly dealt with. It was decided less than a half-century after the
founding of the United States, by the leading authority on the subject.
Justice Story clearly implies in his opinion that the prolonged absence
rule was well settled law in regard to seamen at that time. It seems only
logical to assume, therefore, that the prolonged absence rule was a gen-
erally accepted one in maritime law at the time of the American Revolu-
tion, if not before. Likewise, although there is no English authority on
the point, it is probable that the rule also was part of English maritime
law.
If a prolonged absence was presumptive evidence of intent to desert
in the maritime law, is it not highly probable that, at the very least, the
same rule obtained in the military and naval law? If, as Winthrop has
noted,'5 the discipline of the military law is stricter than that of the
maritime law, can it be considered probable that less evidence would be
required to prove desertion in the maritime law than in the military law?
We can only conclude that since a prolonged absence was sufficient to
prove desertion in the maritime law, it was also sufficient to prove de-
sertion before a court-martial.
12 In Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents, 643 n.73 (2d ed., 1920 Reprint), he says:
"What would absolutely excuse desertion in the merchant service may reasonably be held
to pallitate it in the similar but stricter law of discipline governing the soldier." And
note that a textwriter as early as McArthur discusses both naval and military law together.
1 5 Fed. Cas. 1091, No. 2,907 (C.C. Mass. 1833).
1 Id. at 1094.
15 See note 10 supra.
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Such little evidence as is extant indicates that this was indeed the rule
in the military courts during the early days of the history of the United
States. In one old naval case it is stated:' "and in most cases it is only
by showing a long period of unauthorized absence that a presumption of
intent can be raised." Likewise, the earliest English textwriter on mili-
tary law to deal specifically with the subject, Hough,1 has this to say:
Absence by itself, if continued so long as to exclude the reasonable idea
of a meditated return, will, if unexplained, amount to desertion .... On the
other hand, a short absence would not appear to indicate that he intended
to desert.'8
This author continues to make the same statement in his later works.19
This text statement is important not only because American military
law was copied from the British, 0 but also because of the repeated ten-
dency of American attorneys, both military and civilian, to cite and rely
upon British military textwriters in the early history of the United
States.2 ' Hough himself was cited as an authority in American opinions.22
16 CMO 1-1825, p. 4, as cited in CMO 1-1940, p. 60.
17 Lt. Col. W. Hough, The Practice of Courts-Martial (1825).
18 Id. at 136. And Samuel, Courts-Martial 323 (London, 1816), declares: "Absence,
by itself, if continued so long as to exclude the reasonable idea of a meditated return,
might, if unexplained, or unexplainable, be deemed desertion." Likewise, Delafons, A
Treatise on Naval Courts-Martial 265 (London, 1805), says in discussing desertion:
Seamen are not run on the books of his Majesty's ships, till after they have been
absent three musters checqued without leave; and if taken up within that time, . . .
each is charged twenty shillings straggling money . . . in which case he does not
forfeit his wages, but is liable to punishment by the captain. Although the crime of
desertion is a most capital offense, punishable by death in the navy, as well as in the
army, yet there are fewer instances in the navy, of its being inflicted for such offense.
The discussion of forfeiture of wages refers to the common-law admiralty rule that a
seaman guilty of desertion forfeits all of his wages. The Cadmus v. Matthews, 4 Fed. Cas.
977, No. 2,282 (CCNY 1830).
19 Lt. Col. W. Hough, Precedents in Military Law 131 (1855). And on page 134 he says:
If a deserter gives himself up willing within a few days after he has quitted his
regiment, such circumstance may be taken into favourable consideration, as it shows
that there was no intent to desert the service altogether; but if he does not give him-
self up until many months have elapsed, the act must be presumed to have been the
result of necessity- .... He would then be punished as a deserter. [Hlis not doing so,
but long continued absence, would be a case of desertion.
20 Attorney General Caleb Cushing, in 6 Ops. Att'y Gen. 200, 204 (1853) said:
The general rule is that English statutes passed before the Revolution, and in
amendment of the common law, are to be assumed as part of the common law of
the Colonies.... In this point of view, the English law, except where it is contradicted
by, or incompatible with, our constitutional or statute law, our judicial decisions,
or the spirit of our institutions, has come to be recognised as law in many of the
States; . . . [and] we have to go to the common law as the suggestive, if not the
authoritative, source of many doctrines of law, the forms of practice, the general
principles of reasoning, and even the very meaning of the terms of law. And this
theory applies to the jurisprudence of an exceptional forum, for instance, military
or ecclesiastical, as well as to the ordinary forums of law or equity.
See also, as to the Articles of War: Ansell, "Military Justice," 5 Cornell L.Q. 1, 3 (1919);
Ansell, "Some Reforms In Our System of Military Justice," 32 Yale L.J. 146 (1922);
Morgan, "The Existing Court-Martial System and the Ansell Army Articles," 29 Yale
LJ. 52 (1919); as to the Articles for the Government of the Navy; Pasley and Larkin,
"The Navy Court-Martial: Proposals for its Reform," 33 Cornell L.Q. 195, 196 (1947).
21 In the early days of the United States, before the Civil War, there was no office of
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Two textwriters, whose books appeared somewhat later than Rough's,
in the first half of the nineteenth century, also commented on the pro-
longed absence rule. O'Brien,23 the first American military law textwriter
to write an original military law textbook which was not merely a re-
hash of the English authorities, had this to say: "Absence, of itself, if
continued so long as to exclude the reasonable idea of an intended return,
might, if unexplained or unexplainable, be deemed desertion. " 24  Like-
wise, a noted English authority, Simmons, 25 declared:
The evidence to support the charge of desertion must always vary; the
intention may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence; it may be
inferred or presumed from the length of absence,.2. 6
Both O'Brien and Simmons were also widely used and cited textwriters2 7
Indeed, at one time Attorney-General Caleb Cushing referred to their
books as "the most approved textbooks. 28 In view of these quotations,
it appears clear that the prolonged absence rule was a well-established
fixture in American and English military law long before the advent of
the Civil War.
Two precedents of Civil War vintage also buttress the above argu-
ment. In one opinion, the first Judge Advocate General, under Lincoln,
appears to recognize clearly the existence and effect of the prolonged
absence rule.2 9 In another, the accounting officers of the government
the Judge Advocate General, either in the Army or the Navy. Legal questions arising in
courts-martial were referred to the Attorney-General for his opinion. Hence, it is ex-
tremely significant that the Attorneys-General repeatedly cited and relied upon English
military textwriters. See 1 Ops. Att'y Gen. 166 (Rodney 1811); 1 Ops. Att'y Gen. 233
(Wirt 1818); 1 Ops. Att'y Gen. 294 (Wirt 1819); 1 Ops. Att'y Gen. 296 (Wirt 1819);
3 Ops. Att'y Gen. 714 (Legare 1841); 3 Ops. Att'y Gen. 749 (Legare 1842); 4 Ops. Att'y
Gen. 1 (Legare 1842); 4 Ops. Att'y Gen. 432 (Mason 1845); 4 Ops. Att'y Gen. 444 (Mason
1845).
22 2 Ops. Att'y Gen. 286 (Berrien 1829); 2 Ops. Att'y Gen. 297 (Berrien 1829); 2 Ops.
Att'y Gen. 414 (Berrien 1831); 4 Ops. Att'y Gen. 17 (Legare 1842); 6 Ops. Att'y Gen.
200 (Cushing 1853); 6 Ops. Att'y Gen. 239 (Cushing 1853); 8 Ops. Att'y Gen. 328 (Cush-
ing 1857); 9 Ops. Att'y Gen. 181 (Black 1858). Harwood, U.S. Naval Courts-Martial
(1867) quotes Hough 11 times and Simmons 13 times. This was the earliest American
naval law text.
23 John O'Brien, American Military Laws (1846).
24 Id. at 95.
25 Thomas F. Simmons, Courts-Martial (4th ed. 1852). The above year, 1852, is a
deceptively late date. The first edition of Simmons' text appeared in 1835.
26 Id. at 301. Simmons also says, at the same place:
It is impossible to lay down any particular time of absence which may constitute
a proof of the intention to desert: absence for a considerable time is prima face
evidence of intention not to return, but it is competent to the party accused to bring
in proof, acts, or circumstances, implying a contrary intention. On the other hand,
absence, for a very considerable time, . . . may amount to satisfactory evidence of
the intention to desert.
Harwood, op. cit. supra note 20, at 193, quotes Simmons as to how intent to desert
may be established in another aspect, showing that this section was quite familiar to
American military lawyers.
27 See 6 Ops. Att'y Gen. 239 (Cushing 1853).
28 6 Ops. Att'y Gen. 200, 206 (Cushing 1853).
29 Winthrop, Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocate General of the Army 138, No. 1
(1868):
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recognize and give effect to the rule.30 In both of these cases, it appears
that the opinions assume the rule to be well-settled, and not to require
further discussion of its validity or binding force.
Turning to the post-Civil War era, the two great military law writers
during the period around the turn of the century both discuss the pro-
longed absence rule in their works. Winthrop, probably the most widely
quoted military law writer in the United States,"' has this to say:
A protracted unexplained absence affords indeed a strong presumption
that the party absented himself with the animus of desertion, and the
longer the absence (prior to the arrest), the stronger, in general, the pre-
sumption.32
Davis, in his book, says substantially the same thing,3" and it is not with-
out significance that he held the position of Judge Advocate General of
the Army before World War I. Davis also notes the fact that, by the
Army regulations of 1895, ten days is fixed as the period beyond which
an AWOL soldier was presumed to have deserted.' It might be noted
that the old Navy regulations also contained this same provision.35
It is about this time, in addition, from which the earliest naval au-
thority on the subject dates. Examination of the naval precedents reveals
that the rule" in the Navy also was that "absence of long duration creates
a presumption of specific intent to desert." 6 Thus, several old court-
There is, and can be, no precise rule to determine how short an absence shall constitute
desertion on the part of a soldier, or shall make it proper that the soldier be brought
to trial for desertion.
30 Butterfield, Digest of the Decisions of the Second Comptroller of the Treasury, 1817-
1869, 46, No. 327 (3rd ed. 1869):
A soldier absent from his regiment without authority, for a period of three months,
though voluntarily returning to it, whether tried and convicted or not, is guilty of
desertion, and forfeits the bounty.
Of course, decisions of the accounting officers in respect to contract aspects of desertion
must be examined with care before they are accepted for purposes of a criminal prosecu-
tion for desertion. See generally, Avins, The Law of AWOL, 150 (1957). And it is also
true that such decisions are not binding on military courts. United States v. Coates,
2 USCMA 625, 10 CMR 123 (1953). See also Levitt, "Review of Avins, The Law of
AWOL," 26 Ford. L. Rev. 605 (1957). Nevertheless, such decisions are persuasive as to
what the military law was, especially when fortified by other authority.
31 See Prugh, "Colonel William Winthrop: The Tradition of the Military Lawyer,"
42 A.B.AJ. 126 (1956).
32 Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 638 (2nd ed. 1920 Reprint). On page 640,
he also declares:
The fact that he absented himself animo non revertendi is proved as a presumption
from some one unequivocal fact, as an unexplained long-protracted absence without
authority.
33 Davis, A Treatise on the Military Law of the United States (2nd ed. 1909). At page
420 he declares:
Thus the circumstance that the absence has been exceptionally protracted and quite
unexplained will in general furnish a presumption of the existence of the necessary
intent.
84 Id. at 422.
35 Reed v. United States, 252 Fed. 21 (2d Cir. 1918).
36 McClellan, Naval Digest (Dig. Dec. Sec'y- of the Navy and TJAGs of the Navy,
1862-1916) 168, No. 2 (1916). See too CMO 41-1914, p. 3:
Thus when the prosecution proves the unauthorized absence and the facts of appre-
1959]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
martial orders state: "A long period of absence raises a presumption of
specific intent permanently to abandon the naval service, which pre-
sumption can only be dispelled by a reasonable explanation thereof." 7
The naval law, as thus stated in these decisions, was identical with the
military law; and it can therefore be seen that the rule on this point was
the same in both services. Thus, the prolonged absence rule was a per-
manent part of both military as well as naval law at the turn of the
century in the United States.
The early Army manuals for courts-martial, commencing with the
1895 edition, were small pamphlets which barely set forth the procedure
to be followed, and the text of the Articles of War. They did not contain
any discussion of how intent to desert was to be proved; and hence, they
did not discuss the prolonged absence rule. However, the first real Army
manual for courts-martial, containing a full discussion of procedure,
evidence, and the substantive offenses, put out on the eve of America's
entry into World War I, did contain such a discussion. This manual
declared:
If the condition of absence without leave is much prolonged, and there
is no satisfactory explanation of it, the court may be justified in presuming
from that alone an intent to remain permanently absent. 38
The 1921 edition of the Manual contained identical language.39
In evaluating the fundamental fairness of the above rule, as well as
its accuracy in stating the law, it must never be forgotten that the evi-
dence portions of the 1917 and 1921 Manuals were written by Dean
John H. Wigmore, then on leave from Northwestern University as a
Lieutenant Colonel in the Judge Advocate General's Department. 40 Wig-
more was intensely interested in military law,4' and he often commented
hension and delivery of the accused, this is all that is required to sustain the charge
in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Or if the absence is of such duration or
there are such other circumstances as to justify an inference that the accused intended
permanently to abandon the service or pending contract of enlistment, this is sufficient
even though he may have surrendered. In all. these instances the evidence for the
prosecution constitutes a prima facie case of guilt.
37 Id. at 172, No. 63; CMO 39, 1901, p. 2; CMO 76, 1901; CMO 29, 1914, p. 9. And
in GCMO 158, Navy Dept., Dec. 21, 1897, the Secretary of the Navy declared: "It is
true that 'the duration of the absence of the person is especially material' (Digest of
Opinions of the Judge Advocate General of the Army, Winthrop, 338), but time of absence
alone is not conclusive proof of such intent." Accord: GCMO 115, Navy Dept., Oct. 10,
1900.
38 Manual for Courts-martial, U.S. Army, 1917, 284, at 134.
39 Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S. Army, 1921, 1234, at 226.
40 See the Introduction to the Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S. Army, 1917, p. XIV.
This introduction is also copied in the 1921 Manual. In Brown, "Administration of Justice
in the Army," 3 Cornell L.Q. 178, 202 (1918), it is stated:
The Chapter of the Manual for Courts-Martial referred to above contains about one
hundred paragraphs on the subject of evidence and was revised and approved by
Professor Wigmore.
41 For instance, he published the first casebook on the subject: Source-Book of Military
[Vol. 44
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on it quite favorably.4 2 Thus, he approved heartily of the evidentiary
portions of the Manual for Courts-Martial.43 He said that courts-martial
are generally bound by common law rules of evidence, and noted that
prior to 1916, they were so bound in all cases. 4" It can hardly be sup-
posed that he had overlooked the significance of the prolonged absence
rule, since he himself had incorporated it into the 1917 Manual; hence
it seems clear that he approved of it. The fact that Wigmore himself
wrote the original draft of the prolonged absence rule as it appears in
the Manual goes far towards showing that the rule was historically a
part of the military law, and was always considered as consistent with
the normal common law rules of evidence in criminal trials.
The 1928 Army Manual for Courts-Martial made a slight change in
the language of the rule which change benefited the defendant. The old
rule stated that "the court may be justified in presuming" that the de-
fendant intended to desert. In the 1928 manual, for these words there
was substituted: "the court will be justified in inferring" the requisite
intent.45 The identical language was carried into the 1949 manual, both
for the Army and for the Air Force.40 This is the same language which
appears in the present manual.47
Such naval authority as there is between the two World Wars also fol-
lows the same rule. In one Court-Martial Order, the Judge Advocate
General of the Navy stated:
The Navy Department has held that a prima facie case of desertion is
established when the prosecution proves the unauthorized absence and the
fact of apprehension and delivery or surrender of the accused with an ab-
sence of such duration as to justify an inference that the accused intended
permanently to abandon the naval service.49
And, although the 1917 edition of Naval Courts and Boards makes no
mention of the prolonged absence rule, the 1937 edition recognizes it.,,
Thus, the present prolonged absence rule represents merely a continua-
tion of the older naval law.
Law and War-Time Legislation (1918). See also Wigmore, "Modern Penal Methods in
Our Army," 9 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 163 (1918).
42 Wigmore, "Some Lessons for Civilian Justice to Be Learned from Military justice,"
10 1. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 170 (1919).
43 See 1 Wigrore on Evidence 99 (3rd ed. 1939). Commenting on Naval Courts and
Boards (1937), he says at 101: "In the above Manual ... contains a lucid summary of
the orthodox rules of evidence, in a style corresponding to that of the Army Manual."
44 Ibid.
45 Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S. Army, 1928, 5130, at 143 (1943).
46 Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, 146a, at 199.
47 See note 4 supra.
48 CMO 1-1925, p. 4.
49 CMO 9-1932, p. 8.
59 Naval Courts and Boards, 1937, § 76 declaring that the duration of the absence
establishes a prima fade case.
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Furthermore, it is of considerable significance to an evaluation of the
fundamental fairness and trustworthiness of the prolonged absence rule
that it is in effect in the British services. In the British Manual of Mili-
tary Law it is stated:
The existence of the intent (to desert) ...may be inferred from the
surrounding circumstances. Examples of facts from which the existence
of the intent could be inferred are that the accused:-
(i) has been absent a very long time although he had opportunities
to return.51
It is noteworthy that this example appears as the first example in the
British manual, just as it is the first one in the current American Manual
for Courts-Martial. It thus appears that this rule is recognized in the
British Commonwealth, as it is in the American services, as the most
useful and most trustworthy of rules for ascertaining the intent of the
absentee.
Moreover, this rule has not only been approved by English military
authorities, it has received the approbation of high judicial authority in
England. In Rex v. Mahoney,52 Lord Goddard, Lord Chief Justice of
England, speaking for a unanimous Court-Martial Appeals Court, had
this to say: "If a man is absent from Oct. 9 to Oct. 31, I should say that
that is ample time on which a court-martial might hold that he did not
intend to return. 5 3 Thus, it is clear that the prolonged absence rule has
been a part of the military law for at least a century and a half; and it
appears probable that it has been a part of the military common-law for
a much longer period of time. This rule has therefore stood the test of
centuries of experience, in both the United States and the British Com-
monwealth, and its continued existence is fully justified from an historical
point of view.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RULE
The Manual for Courts-Martial, in discussing the circumstances which
will justify or negative a finding of an intent to desert, does not limit
itself merely to a commentary on the prolonged absence rule. Quite to
the contrary, it lists a number of circumstances which may be adduced
to prove the requisite intent. Those listed are:
1. Accused attempted to dispose of his uniform or other military
property.
51 Manual of Military Law, 1956, 251 n.2b, interpreting the Army Act, § 37 (Desertion).
Almost identical language is contained in the Manual of Air Force Law, 1956, 268 n.2b.
And the Manual of Military Law, 1951, 211 n.2b, says:
Evidence of intention not to return to His Majesty's service may be inferred from
such facts as the length of absence.
52 (1956) 3 All E.R. 79.9 (Ct. Mar. App. Ct.).
53 Id. at 801.
[Vol. 44
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2. He purchased a ticket for a distant point or was arrested or sur-
rendered at a considerable distance from his station.
3. While absent he was in the neighborhood of military posts or stations
and did not surrender.
4. He was dissatisfied in his company, on his ship, or with military
service.
5. He had made remarks indicating an intention to desert the service.
6. He was under charges or had escaped from confinement at the time
he absented himself.
7. Just previous to absenting himself he stole money, civilian clothes,
or other property that would assist him in getting away.54
In addition, there are a number of other well-recognized circumstances
from which an intent to desert may be inferred. For example, the fact
that the accused had a civilian job, engaged in business, or supported
himself through black market or other criminal activities would tend to
show that he did not intend to return to the service. Likewise, an intent
to desert may be inferred more readily if the absence was commenced in
time of war, or in a combat zone, since, under some circumstances at
least, the accused might desire to leave the service permanently to avoid
the hazards of war.
With all of these circumstances from which an intent to desert may be
proved, it may be asked, of what special significance is the prolonged
absence rule? In other words, why is the prolonged absence rule of any
more importance than the rule, for example, that an intent to desert may
be inferred from the distance which an accused travels from his station,
or from the fact that he is apprehended wearing civilian clothes, or from
any of the other circumstances noted above, or any combination of them?
What makes the prolonged absence rule so important in the trial of a
desertion case is that, typically, it constitutes the only reliable method
available to prove the requisite intent. The reason for this is two-fold,
the general unavailability of other evidence, and the variable probative
value of such other evidence even when it is available.
The typical desertion case arrives in the prosecution's office with evi-
dence of few, if any, of the indicia of intent to desert known or available
to the prosecution to prove such intent. This is not to say that evidence
of such circumstances as would justify a finding of. an intent to desert is
non-existent; it may be, in fact, abundant. However, the existence and
location of such evidence is generally a matter peculiarly within the
knowledge of the accused, who can hardly be expected to divulge it.
Furthermore, as an absence becomes more and more prolonged, the
availability of evidence of intent to desert, aside from the very length of
54 Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S. 1951, 164a, at 314.
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the absence itself, decreases. Witnesses die, resign, retire, move, or are
transferred. Documents become lost or destroyed. Real evidence cannot
be found. Thus, by the very fact that an absence is prolonged, it is not
infrequently impossible to prove other circumstances which would tend
to show that the accused had the requisite intent.
The fact is, that in the usual desertion case, the prosecution knows
only that the accused went absent without leave, remained absent for a
period, and surrendered or was apprehended. What the accused did
during the period he was absent, where he went, why he left the service,
or even why he returned if he surrendered, is generally wholly unknown
to -the prosecution. It is the rare case indeed in which, before leaving,
the accused has broadcast his intentions. Faced by such a blank wall, is
it any wonder that the prosecution desires to use the only circumstance
known to it to establish the requisite intent? As was said in a naval case:
the duration of unauthorized absence when proved is one of the facts
from which intent to desert may be inferred, ... and in most cases this
is the only evidence which the prosecution can offer to establish the of-
fense.55
Even when evidence of other circumstances is available, the prosecution
usually still relies basically on the prolonged absence rule to prove the
requisite intent to desert. The reason for this is the variable probative
value of the evidence of such other circumstances. The fact is that each
of the other factors surrounding the unauthorized absence except its
duration must always be evaluated in light of the circumstances, not only
of the particular case, but also of the prosecution's case as it may be
proved on trial, to determine its probative effect. This uncertainty
weakens the value of such circumstances as an indication of intent to
desert.
Nor does the above statement apply solely to indicia which are gen-
erally of questionable probative value. Even the usual tests for such
intent are liable to have an insufficient probative value in particular
cases. Thus, for example, the second set of circumstances mentioned in
the Manual for Courts-Martial as ones from which an intent to desert
may be inferred is that the accused traveled a considerable distance from
his station. Yet an Army Board of Review, in reversing a conviction of
desertion by a court-martial in Lieutenant Sower's case,55 had this to say
about the distance which accused had travelled:
Although he surrendered to the military authorities at a place which was
1160 miles from his proper station, that fact, standing alone, and when
55 CMO 1-1925, p. 4.
56 CM 229525, Sower, 17 BR 167 (1943).
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considered in the light of modem transportation facilities, should not be
treated as compelling an inference of such an intent.57
The third circumstance on the list of factors by which the requisite
intent may be proved is that the accused failed to surrender to military
authority although he was in the vicinity of military posts. Yet this, too,
cannot always be relied upon by the prosecution to establish the necessary
intent to desert. In Private Fairchild's case,s in reversing a conviction
for desertion, the Board of Review had this to say:
The failure of a soldier who is absent without leave to surrender while
in the neighborhood of a military station may, under some circumstances,
be indicative of an intent to desert (par. 130a, M.C.M.). But the mere
failure of a soldier to surrender while living openly with his wife in a small
community at the very gates of his post, as in this case, is merely an ele-
ment of his continued absence and furnishes no substantial basis for an
inference of intent to desert.59
The sixth circumstance on the list, that the accused had escaped from
confinement, is still another criterion of intent to desert of a well-settled
nature which cannot always be relied upon as proof of the necessary
intent, for there are numerous cases in which this factor too was present,
and yet a finding of desertion was reversed."0 And the last item on this
list furnishes a still further example of the point; for normally the wear-
ing of civilian clothes is considered a significant factor tending to indicate
that the accused intended to remain absent permanently, and so sought
to conceal his military status. But this, too, is not an infallible test, for
an Air Force Board of Review, in United States v. Ingraharm," thus
characterized its significance:
Furthermore, the fact that he was apprehended in civilian clothes is of
no probative value because all airmen in the United States were then per-
mitted to wear civilian clothes when off duty.62
57 Id. at'170. And in CM 2084562, Meier, 9 BR 9 (1937), another Army Board of
Review had this to say at 11:
* . . but the record, in its aspect most unfavorable to accused, shows no more than
that he absented himself without leave and, while absent, went with conscious purpose
to the general locality of his home before surrendering. In the opinion of the Board
of Review, the mere fact that he traveled a considerable distance from his station,
about 600 miles, is not, under the circumstances of the case and in the absence of other
incriminating factors, sufficient to establish intent not to return thereto.
58 CM 213817, Fairchild, 10 BR 287 (1940).
59 Id. at 289.
0 See United States v. Scheaffer, 9 CMR 847 (ACM 1953), and the cases cited therein.
In that case, the accused also stole an ambulance which he used as a get-away car. Thus,
no intent to desert was found in spite of the presence of two factors, from each of which
the Manual for Courts-Martial says an intent to desert may be inferred.
61 1 (AF)CMR 520 (ACM 1949).
02 Id. at 527. And in CM 196187 Roath, 2 BR 333 (1931), an Army Board of Review
bad this to say:
The fact that at the time of apprehension accused was dressed in civilian clothes
cannot properly be said to show a fixed intention to desert the service, for the reason
that it is a matter of common knowledge that enlisted men in peace-time are permitted
to wear civilian clothing outside Army posts.
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The problem is not confined to indicia listed in the Manual for Courts-
Martial alone. Quite to the contrary, it extends to all other factors which
may give rise to an inference of intent to desert except a prolonged
absence. For instance, one of the oldest of such factors not enumerated
in the Manual is that the absence took place in time of war, 3 for it is
then a not unlikely inference that the accused left to avoid the hazards
of combat.6 4 Yet this too is a factor on which the prosecution may not
invariably depend. Thus, one Board of Review held during World War
II that "mere absence in time of war, unattended by other incriminating
circumstances, cannot in reason be given greater probative force than is
given to such absence in time of peace. ' 6 5
Likewise, another weapon of ancient vintage in the prosecution's
arsenal, and one which would seem to indicate almost invariably that
the accused had severed his employment with the military permanently,
is the fact that he took a civilian job. But even this sometimes misfires.
In United States v. Evans,6" an Air Force Board of Review declared:
And his civilian employment, in the circumstances, was as consistent
with his statement of intention to return to his station as it is with prosecu-
tion's theory that an intention to desert could be inferred therefrom."T
The examples given above are by no means exhaustive. The fact is,
that every circumstance from which a court-martial might logically infer
an intent to desert, except for a prolonged absence, is subject to the same
infirmity; there are cases wherein such factor lacks any probative value
in regard to proving the requisite intent.
Interestingly enough, factors, other than the shortness of the period of
absence, which would normally indicate an intent to return and which
are traditionally brought forth by the defense, are subject to the same
infirmity as are those factors favoring the prosecution. An excellent ex-
ample of this is the fact that the accused wore his uniform while absent.
Traditionally, courts-martial have considered this as an indication of an
intent to return, because it shows that the accused was not attempting to
63 In Winthrop, op. cit. supra note 10, at 638, the author declares:
And, in time of war, an absence of slight duration may be as significant as a consider-
ably longer one in time of peace.
64 See, for example, CM A-2244, Tyree, 3 A-P 195 (1945). And in ETO 15272, Nichols,
29 ETO 67 (1945), the Board of Review declared:
The uncontradicted evidence shows that each accused left his command without
authority on 28 February 1945, and remained absent until his apprehension in the
month of May, over two months later. Their departure took place during a period of
war and at a particular time when their organization was approaching and expecting
to engage the enemy. . . . From these facts, unexplained, the court was justified in
inferring that the absence without leave of accused was accompanied by the intention
not to return, or to avoid hazardous duty, or to shirk important service.
65 CM 226261, Wilcox, 15 BR 55 (1942).
66 1 (AF)CMR 114 (ACM 1948).
67 Id. at 120.
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conceal his status. However, during World War II, in numerous cases,
Boards of Review in the European Theater of Operations held that the
fact that accused woie his uniform lacked probative value because an
American in Europe dressed in uniform was less likely to be suspected
of being an unauthorized absentee than an American dressed in civilian
clothes, since almost all Americans in Europe were soldiers.6 Many
other examples of this same treatment accorded to familiar rules for
ascertaining the intent of an absent serviceman can be found. 9 When
such time-honored indicia of intent to desert or lack thereof become
valueless under the circumstances of particular cases, it is clear that the
length of the absence without leave becomes of the utmost significance.
The illusive probative value of other indicia of intent to desert, either
singly or in combination, is in sharp contrast to the fixed value of a given
duration of absence. Of course, a smaller duration of absence, combined
with other circumstances noted above, may outweigh a longer duration,
standing alone; however, when the lengths of absence are taken alone,
the longer the absence, the stronger is the inference that at some time
during that period the accused, in the inner recesses of his mind, formed
the intention not to return to military service. Thus, absent other cir-
cumstances to the contrary, the longer the absence the stronger the
inference of intent to desert.
In addition, the length of absence always has probative value, in
marked contrast to the other factors noted above, which may, under
some circumstances, be wholly devoid of probative value. Even where
it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that the accused had com-
pelling reasons to go AWOL, other than a desire to separate himself per-
68 See ETO 1629, O'Donnell, 5 ETO 119 (1944) and numerous other cases following it.
And in United States v. McConnell, 1 CMR 320, 322 (CM 1951), a Board of Review held:
The fact that he was in uniform when apprehended is not controlling. To be dressed
in civilian clothes in a theater of operations is far more likely to excite suspicion than
to remain in uniform.69 For example, the Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S. 1951, 164a implies that a factor
from which a court-martial may infer an intent to return is the fact that the accused had
recently re-enlisted or applied for the regular Army. Yet, in Goulet v. Queen (1957) 1 Can-
ada C.M.A.R. 19 (1952), the Court-Martial Appeal Board of Canada held that such facts
did not tend to negative an intent to avoid active service under the facts and circumstances
of that case. And although the Manual for Courts-Martial, following very early precedent,
indicates that surrender of the accused is evidence of intent to return, in GCMO 20, Navy
Dept., Mar. 15, 1899, the Secretary of the Navy said: "It is not true that the voluntary
surrender of an absentee is sufficient in itself to .make it impossible to prove desertion; for
although, as stated by Winthrop (Military Law and Precedents, page 196), the fact that
a person surrenders himself as a deserter after but brief absence may properly be regarded
as an extenuating circumstance, such fact is not conclusive as against desertion.' Like-
wise, CMO 16-1913, p. 4, declares that "the subsequent voluntary return of a deserter,
even within a reasonable time, does not, in itself, rebut the presumption of guilt arising
from his previous act. In the absence of a reasonable excuse in the case of unauthorized
voluntary withdrawal from the service, the intent to permanently abandon it must be in-
ferred, and it would be more reasonable to so infer than to presume that an unauthorized
voluntary lengthy absence indicated a return at some future time.
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manently from the service, nevertheless, the duration of the absence
may be weighed in the balance, and may be so persuasive standing alone
as to permit the inference that at some period of time he had formed in
his mind the idea of not returning to the service 7 Because of these facts,
the length of the absence without leave assumes a primary importance
as the only constant in a situation of variables.
From the above noted factors, moreover, there is a subsidiary con-
sequence. Since the length of the absence without leave is the only factor
whose legal significance remains constant, as well as the only factor whose
precise size can be measured with mathematical certainty, it is the only
factor which a court may use to compare one desertion case in a mean-
ingful way with a precedent from a previous case. Looking at the matter
from another angle, all other factors must be evaluated in the light of
the circumstances of the individual case to determine their probative
effect, thus greatly weakening their value for precedent purposes; only
the duration of the absence may be considered independently. Indeed,
as a practical matter, desertion cases are first compared by the duration
of the absences involved; only when the duration of absence is com-
parable does a military court attempt to line up the other circumstances
bearing on the case. In testing for the legal sufficiency of a finding of
intent to desert, it would be unheard of for a military court to compare
a desertion case in which the accused was absent for 12 hours with one
wherein he was gone for 12 years, although all the other circumstances
adduced bearing on the intent were similar. Thus, the prolonged absence
rule is the only rule for ascertaining intent which lends itself easily to
precedent formation. Since lawyers much prefer to have an element
established in their favor as a matter of law, rather than leave it to a
fact-finding body's unpredictable determination, the prolonged absence
rule assumes a primary significance for both prosecution and defense in
desertion cases.
IV. THE FUNCTION OF THE RULE
Before discussing the present status of the prolonged absence rule in
light of the most recent decisions of the United States Court of Military
Appeals, it would be well to review the precise function of the rule in
proving the requisite intent to remain away permanently.
Formerly, a prolonged absence was deemed to give rise to a presump-
tion of intent to desert.7 ' When the absence was very prolonged, state-
ments can be found indicating that such prolonged absence would be
70 See United States v. Linerode, 11 CMR 262 (CM 1953).
71 Note 36 supra.
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considered desertion as a matter of law. Thus, in a World War I case,
the Judge Advocate General of the Army declared: "absence without
leave may be so prolonged that, unexplained and terminated by appre-
hension, it may be said as a matter of law, to constitute desertion.... ."71
Likewise, a Board of Review declared during World War II: "The ab-
sence of the accused for approximately fifteen and one-half months was
so prolonged as to create an almost conclusive presumption of intent to
desert."73
These statements are not correct, both on reason and on authority. An
absence, no matter how prolonged, is never desertion as a matter of law.
From a prolonged absence, the requisite intent may be inferred. How-
ever, a finding of a prolonged absence is not ipso facto a finding of de-
sertion. As the Court of Military Appeals held in one of its early cases,
the remark of a trial judge advocate that "if a member of the naval service
absents himself for a period of forty, fifty, sixty, or a hundred days, he
intended to desert and there is no question about it" constituted pre-
judicial error 74
Since no matter how prolonged an absence is, its sole result is to create
an inference of the intent, it is always open to the accused to rebut this
inference by presenting evidence which would cast doubt on the inference.
While such evidence is very generally the accused's own testimony, re-
lating what he did during the absence, it need not necessarily be his own
statement. Such evidence may be documentary, or it may consist of the
testimony of other witnesses, or other evidence which would so account
for his absence as to dispel the inference. Since this evidence is almost
always in the exclusive possession of the accused, unless he produces it,
the court may rationally infer that his activities during his absence
would, at the very least, not dispel the inference, and act accordingly.
While a recital of accused's activities during his AWOL and other
circumstances presented in defense may not be enough to rebut the
inference,7" it is always open for him to try, and no matter how long the
AWOL is, it is always possible that he can overcome the inference of
intent to desert. Thus, in one World War I case, where the accused was
absent for a year and a half, the Judge Advocate General held that the
accused had successfully dispelled the inference of intent to desert.76
72 CM 125904, Moore (1919), Dig. Ops. JAG 1912-40, § 416(8), at 268.
73 CM 266918, Freeman, 43 BR 317 (1944), at 319.
74 United States v. Nash, 1 USCMA 538, 4 CMR 130 (1952).
75 CM 318130, Scott, 67 BR 151 (1947). In this case, it was held that a four and a half
month AWOL was sufficient to prove an intent to desert although the accused surrendered,
wore his uniform, and stayed with sick relatives.
76 CM 135431, Phillips (1919), Dig. CM Rev. 278 (1920). In this case the accused
surrendered. While AWOL, he supported a sick mother, his wife and child, and helped
his father.
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In another case, an accused had been AWOL for a year and seven months,
did not like his station, had had a fight with his commander, had civilian
employment, and had evaded apprehension. At trial, the law officer
failed to allow statements in evidence which the accused offered as tes-
timony to prove he intended to return. It was held that this was preju-
dicial error, since the court might have found no intent to desert although
evidence to support the inference of desertion was very strong.77 And
finally, in a World War II case involving an absence of two years and
seven months, a Board of Review, in reversing for prejudicial error,
declared that "it is not inconceivable that the court might have found
the accused guilty of absence without leave ... in the absence of other
inculpatory circumstances showing an intention to remain permanently
absent."78
It therefore appears that the function of the prolonged absence rule
is to cast on the accused the burden of explaining the reason for his
absence, failing which a court may assume that prolonged absence in-
dicates an intent never to return.
V. COTHERN AND ITS PROGENY
Having brought the function of the prolonged absence rule into focus,
there now remains the problem of analyzing its current status in light of
recent decisions of the United States Court of Military Appeals. Such
an analysis must necessarily commence with a consideration of the widely
and justly criticized case of United States v. Cothern.9
In the Cothern case, the accused was AWOL for only 17 days, but was
tried for and convicted of desertion. The law officer, after instructing
the court as to the prolonged absence rule, declared:
If the court finds that an absence of approximately 17 days has been
proved, it is for the court to determine if such period of absence is a much
prolonged one under all the facts and circumstances in this case.80
Although the opinion points out that even the trial counsel conceded the
fact that this period was not a "prolonged" absence, the Court passes
the point by. (Judge Latimer, however, says that such a period could not
support the finding, thus appearing to agree that seventeen days is not
a prolonged period.)
77 United States v. Peters, 19 CMR 600 (CGCM 1955).
78 CM 321618, Gardner, 70 BR 71, 78 (1947). See also United States v. Swain, 8
USCMA 387, 24 CMR 197 (1957), where the absence was for 12 years.
79 8 USCMA 158, 23 CMR 382 (1957). For some of the havoc wrought by Cothern, see
Wheat, "Desertion?," The JAG Journal, June, 1958, at 9. See also Jones, "Changing Con-
cepts in the Administration of Military Justice," Army, July 1958, at 46, 50. But cf. Riter,
"Review of the Law of AWOL," 6 Utah L. Rev. 150, 151 (1958).
80 Id. at 383.
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In reversing the conviction, however, Judge Ferguson argued against
the prolonged absence rule. He said:
The first paragraph of the instructions set forth above states that if the
absence alleged is characterized as much prolonged, and is not explained
to the court-martial's satisfaction, they might infer from that "fact" alone
that the accused intended to desert. Thus, on the basis of this first para-
graph, the court-martial could believe that if they found that the absence
was much prolonged they would not have to consider the intent of the
accused.81
In support of the above proposition he quotes Justice Jackson's opinion
in Morissette v. United States, 2 that "a presumption which would permit
but not require the jury to assume intent from an isolated fact would
prejudge a conclusion which the jury should reach of its own volition."'
(Emphasis by USCMA.)
The above argument has two answers. One of them was given by
Judge Latimer, who concurred specially in the result but dissented from
the rationale. He declared in substance that the inference was justified
from a prolonged absence even if that were the only fact on the record. 4
Even if this were the only thing which could be said in favor of the pro-
longed absence rule, it certainly should be enough to sustain it.
In addition, however, the principal opinion cannot stand close analysis
for the simple reason that it is founded on a complete non sequitur. That
a fact-finder may infer an intent from a single act does not mean that he
need not consider whether the intent existed; if that were the case, he
would need only consider whether the act alleged happened. But by
81 Id. at 384.
342 U.S. 246 (1952).
83 Id. at 275.
84 Judge'Latimer, in 8 USCMA at 161, 23 CMR at 386, said:
As I understand an inference it is a process of reasoning by which one fact sought
to be established- in this instance, intent to remain away permanently- may be
deduced as a logical consequence of another fact- here an unexplained prolonged
absence. I believe it fair to say that that inference is neither illogical nor without
substantial support in prolonged absence cases, for, unlike my associates, I am sure
that when a member of the armed forces leaves without authority and remains away
without explanation for an extended period- such as 17 months or 17 years, as sug-
gested by my associates in their opinion-most well-thinking persons would deduce
reasonably that the status had become permanent and that the absentee would not
return until compelled to do so. I, therefore, cannot join with my colleagues in their
sweeping condemnation of this long-recognized principle.
. . . Thus, the Manual does no more than simply announce that a much prolonged
absence which is not satisfactorily explained is a circumstance from which the court
members may infer justifiably the intent to desert. If that deduction does not follow
logically then I misunderstand human behavior. Of course, if there are other facts
or circumstances which tend to support or undermine the inference, they, too, should
be considered by the members of the court in ascertaining intent. That, however, does
not mean that the triers of fact cannot infer an intent to desert from what is, in fact,
an unexplained prolonged absence when there are no other circumstances casting
light on the accused's state of mind. Certainly one fact or set of facts may support
an inference of intent. ...
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making the inference permissive, the fact-finder is required, even where
there is no rebuttal evidence,85 to weigh the inference against his own
general knowledge in determining whether the necessary intent existed.
As such, the ultimate question of whether the intent existed is never pre-
judged, for even when it is established that the absence was prolonged
as a matter of law, and even when no rebuttal evidence whatsoever was
introduced, the inference, because it is permissive, must still be tested
against the fact-finder's general knowledge of human behavior. It there-
fore seems that the major problem in the principal opinion is one of
semantics.
To support its position, the principal opinion invokes some language
in Morissette which at first glance might be taken as disapproving the
right of the fact-finder to draw an inference from a single fact. But this
language must be read in context, and not as an "isolated" sentence. The
Morissette opinion was mostly concerned with a conclusive presumption
(i.e., a rule of law) of intent arising from a taking of property,"0 an issue
which even the principal opinion recognizes is not here involved. Fur-
thermore, numerous factors on both sides of the issue of intent were
involved in Morissette. Hence the statement about the permissive pre-
sumption based on one fact on the prosecution's side must merely mean
that when there are other factors present in the record, the fact-finder
must consider all of them. This statement lends no support to the
Cothern opinion, for in desertion cases the prosecution's arsenal all too
often consists of the single, "isolated" fact of prolonged absence with the
accused remaining silent. It simply seems unreasonable to believe that
Justice Jackson in Morissette found that it would be artificial for a fact
finder to infer intent from a single fact if none other appeared.
Furthermore, footnote 34 of that opinion, 7 which is the only authority
supporting the statement made by Justice Jackson, cites the two articles
on presumptions written by Professor Morgan, chairman of the com-
mittee which drafted the Uniform Code. 8 These two articles, if anything,
support, rather than contradict, the prolonged absence rule, and consti-
tute merely another item of evidence that the contradiction between the
rule and Morissette is more imagined than real.
85 The student note in 46 Geo. LJ. 354, 356-57 (1958) deals only with situations where-
in the accused attempts to explain the absence. Since the intent must be considered where
there is no explanation offered, a fortiori it must be considered where an explanation is
given.
86 ibid. The point, at best, is collateral, and need not be gone into.
87 Note 81 supra.
88 Morgan, "Instructing the Jury on Presumptions and Burden of Proof," 47 Harv. L.
Rev. 59 (1933); Morgan, "Some Observations Concerning Presumptions," 44 Harv. L. Rev.
906 (1931).
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The only other case support in Cothern consists of Judge Ferguson's
two previous opinions in United States v. Millers9 and United States v.
Ball,"° the former relying on the latter. In the latter case, we find the
opinion relying on one of Professor Morgan's articles on presumptions,"
and on Wigmore on Evidence 2 Thus, it can be said that Cothemn, de-
rivatively, relies on Wigmore on Evidence. But, as was noted above,
Wigmore wrote the evidence portion of the 1917 Manual for Courts-
Martial, which included the first modern statement of the prolonged
absence rule 3 Hence, in Cothern, we find the singularly ironic phenom-
enon of Wigmore on evidence (civilian) being relied upon to overrule
Wigmore on evidence (military).
Finally, there is one remaining prop to support the opinion in the
Cothern case. The only other citation to any authority of any kind is as
follows: "See, for a general discussion on other aspects of this problem,
H. H. Brandenburg, Proof of Intent to Desert 17 The Federal Bar Jour-
nal, April-June, 1957." 9 The author has been informed by Captain
Brandenburg that no such article has ever been published. The article
may presently be found in its unpublished form in the Navy JAG library.
Hence, the opinion in Cothern relies on two inapplicable cases and one
article which, because it was not published, could not be analyzed by the
military bar before it found its way into the overturning of a long-estab-
lished rule of law.
The "author" of the phantom article cited in Cothern has, however,
written a defense of Cothern in which he concedes that the case "over-
turned a standardized procedure for proving desertion which has been a
fixture in the American military scene since the earliest days of our
military establishment."95 He also concedes that the case threw great
confusion into the law. In defense of Cothern, however, he asserts that
the "prolonged absence rule effectively made a deserter out of many a
sailor whose only real offense was unauthorized absence for 60 days or
more." He also, on the one hand, complains that the sentences for de-
sertion were too uniform, while on the other he belabors the prolonged
absence rule "as a breeding place for this lack of uniformity."
This defense, however, will not stand close scrutiny. The possibility
that an absentee without leave who always intended to return would be
convicted of desertion is very remote. The charge of desertion must run
89 8 USCMA 33, 23 CMR 257 (1957).
90 8 USCMA 25. 23 CMR 249 (1957).
91 Morgan, supra note 88.
92 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940), § 2491(2) cited at 8 USCMA at 31, 23 CMR at 255.
93 Note 38 supra.
94 8 USCMA at 161, 23 CMR at 385.
95 Brandenburg, "Desertion After Cothern's Case," 4 JAG J. 23 (Dec. 1957-Jan. 1958).
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the gauntlet of the investigating officer, court-martial, staff judge ad-
vocate, convening authority, and board of review. In each of these steps,
the accused's guilt must be convincing beyond a reasonable doubt. If
sailors are being convicted, right and left, of desertion, when they are
only absentees without leave, then something is very wrong with the ad-
ministration of naval justice, and not with the prolonged absence rule.
The truth of this sweeping statement, however, is at the least doubtful,
for naval boards of review seem not in the least reluctant to reverse a
conviction for desertion even when the absence is prolonged as a matter
of law.96 At any rate, the far-fetched possibility that an incorrect con-
viction might slip through all of these screening processes hardly justifies
throwing the baby out with the bath. Indeed, it would be far more
accurate to say that Cothern effectively made an absentee without leave
out of many deserters from the services.
The major defect of Cothern is that it fails to recognize the article
denouncing desertion for what it actually is, the application of a criminal
sanction to the violation of an employment relationship.97 This analysis
was recognized as early as the time of Lord Coke,9" and yet the Court of
Military Appeals still persists in talking about purely military offenses
in the same way that it discusses civilian crimes. Thus, the principal
" See, for example, United States v. DeGraffenreid, 23 CMR 659 (NCM 1957), where
the AWOL was for 110 days.
97 No better analysis of the basis of absence offenses can be gained than from the
vantage-point of their effect on the military. For example, the following appears in the
N.Y. Times, May 20, 1958, p. 20, col. 3:
Thomas S. Gates Jr., Secretary of the Navy, used Armed Forces Day last Saturday
as the starting point of a campaign to accentuate the positive. In a letter to all com-
manding officers of ships and stations in the Navy and Marine Corps accompanying
a new General Order No. 21, he started a comprehensive attempt to improve naval
leadership.
Mr. Gates said in his letter that "the increasing disciplinary problems in the Naval
Establishment, especially AWOL (absent without leave) rates, brig population, have
been a matter of grave concern to me." He continued:
"The AWOL rate rose 30 per cent in 1957 over 1956 and courts-martial continue
at a rate of 1,000 a week. The human and financial losses in terms of wasted man-
power cannot be afforded, either by the Navy or by our country.
Many of our problems can be resolved with leadership, better personnel manage-
ment, and a sincere evaluation of basic moral standards."
It may be that the student commentator in Note, 46 Geo. L.J. 354, 359 (1958) was grop-
ing in this direction when he discussed public policy and military necessity as the basis
of the prolonged absence rule.
98 The Case of Soldiers, 6 Co. Rep. 27a, 77 Eng. Rep. 293 (1601). See also The Soldier's
Case, Hutt. 134, 123 Eng. Rep. 1154, Cro. Car. 71, 79 Eng. Rep. 663 (1628). And another
illustration of the fact that the law of desertion, in its formative years before the first
Mutiny Act of 1689, grew out of the law of master and servant, in addition to the examples
in admiralty law, is contained in Marshall, Military Miscellany 12 (1846), where it is
stated: "During the sixteenth century, and for a long time after, the recruiting of the
Army appears to have depended chiefly upon the Captains of companies, each captain
recruiting his own company, which seems to have been in some measure his own prop-
erty." Compare also the striking similarity of the derivation of UCMJ, Art. 85(a) (3) (see
Grant v. Gould, 2 H. Bl. 69, 126 Eng. Rep. 434 (1792)) with the old action of seduction
per quod servitium amisit.
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opinion declares that "An absence of seventeen days, or seventeen months,
or seventeen years, is only an absence-though its probative value may
be great-and is not a substitute for intent." 99 Nevertheless, if an em-
ployee of a private company took off for seventeen months or seventeen
years, 100 would his employer feel certain that he was gone forever? There
is no question but that he would. Would a government employee who left
for seventeen months or seventeen years without communication with his
agency return to find his job waiting for him? He certainly would not.
What if the law clerk to one of the judges who was in the majority in
Cothe left for a period of seventeen months or seventeen years, would
that judge leave the position vacant in the expectation that such clerk
would some day return? To say the least, it seems most doubtful.
True it is that the application of criminal sanctions requires a higher
degree of certainty than would the application of civil penalties. But
that certainty is gained in just the same way as any lower degree of
certainty. Thus, in spite of the tenderness of admiralty law to seamen,
a prolonged absence gives rise to an inference of intent to desert in ad-
miralty, 10 and until 1915, desertion by a seaman was a crime,02 just as
it is in the military. Today, although desertion in admiralty law only
entails civil forfeitures, the period of absence denominated as "long" is
much shorter than in the military.0 3 If a short period of absence without
leave is sufficient to support an inference of intent to desert by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, a much longer period should sustain such
99 8 USCMA at 161, 23 CMR at 385.
100 Of course, even when there is a contract, an employer may discharge an employee
for even a very short absence from his job. See, for example, Craig v. Thompson, 244
S.W.2d 37 (Mo. 1951); Georgiades v. Glickman, 272 Wis. 257, 75 N.W.2d 573 (1956);
Blum Bros. Box Co. v. Wisconsin Labor Relations Board, 229 Wis. 615, 282 N.W. 98
(1938).
101 Cloutman v. Tunison, supra note 11. And in Phiehl v. Balchen, 19 Fed. Cas. 622,
No. 11,137 (S.D.N.Y. 1844), the court declared at 624:
... there is nothing to excuse the libellant in concealing himself on shore, and con-
tinuing his absence from the vessel until her departure from Buenos Aires. The vessel
remained seven or eight days longer at that port; and it is proved that the master
inquired where the libellant could be found. [Tlhere was ample time for the libellant
to have returned to his service on board, had he desired to do so. The lodgings of
the master on shore were well-known to him, where he could have reported himself
at once. It must be presumed he avoided doing either, because he intended to abandon
the vessel. . . I feel bound to hold that he voluntarily left the vessel at Buenos
Ayres without leave, and without intending to return to her. Such abandonment of
the ship is a desertion.
102 The Italier, 257 Fed. 712 (2d Cir. 1919). See R.S. of 1877, 4596, Act of 7 June 1872,
17 Stat. 273, c. 322, § 51.
103 In Flynn v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 44 F. Supp. 50 (E.D.N.Y. 1942), the libelant, a
seaman, left his ship without leave on July 16th and remained away for only 13 days.
Yet Chief Judge Inch held that he had deserted, saying at 53:
The ship was compelled to remain tied up until July 29, when the new crew from
San Francisco arrived and took over, then she sailed. During this long period it is
plain from the testimony that any of these strikers could have come back on board,
reported for -duty and gone to work, but none, except as stated, did so.
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inference beyond any reasonable doubt. In both cases, the difference is
one of degree only, and not of kind. Therefore, in failing to recognize
the essential nature of desertion as an offense against an employment
relation, the Court of Military Appeals in Cothern promulgated unsound
law.
Not only is Cothern wrong in itself, but it has spawned progeny which
are at once both numerous and hideous. For example, in United States
v. Burgess,'0 decided the same day as Cothern, the Court of Military
Appeals, by a divided vote, reversed a conviction for desertion where the
accused was AWOL over six months because the law officer instructed
the court that it might find the intent from the prolonged absence alone.
Likewise, in United States v. Nelson,"0 5 the same result was reached,
again based on Cotkern, where the accused was AWOL for fifteen months.
And in United States v. Soccio,0 6 a like result was reached where the
accused was away for four and a half years. And there are other decisions,
growing in geometric progression, which bid fair to become even more
extreme.10 7
To what extent Cothern and its progeny represent the military law
cannot now be told with certainty. To delve into this question would
entail a jurisprudential discussion of whether judges make, find, or
interpret law, and whether their decisions are law or merely evidence of
what the law is. Whether future changes in the court's personnel will
result in a reversion to the traditional prolonged absence rule also cannot
be predicted at this time. The Cothern case so far flies in the face of
stare decisis,108 legislative interpretation, 09 and every other canon of
104 8 USCMA 163, 23 CMR 387 (1957).
105 8 USCMA 278, 24 CMR 88 (1957).
106 8 USCMA 477, 24 CMR 287 (1957).
107 See, for example, United States v. Gravley, 9 USCMA 120, 25 CMR 382 (1958)
(AWOL for 2 yrs. 5 mo.); United States v. Krause, 8 USCMA 746, 25 CMR 250 (1958)
(AWOL for 2 yrs.).
108 This is not to say that the Court of Military Appeals should never change a rule
of military law. But such changes should be made only after an exhaustive review of all
of the preceding authorities and only for cogent reasons, and where the rule has been
so long in existence, these reasons ought to be absolutely compelling. To this writer, at
least, Cothern is not even mildly persuasive, let alone compelling. No comment is necessary
on whether the review of authorities in Cothern was "exhaustive."
109 The opinion suggests that there may be something in the Uniform Code of Military
Justice to support it. It states: "Insofar as this portion of the Manual sets forth an er-
roneous principle of law- as distinguished from a rule of evidence-this Court is not
bound thereby. Where the Manual conflicts with the Code or the law, as interpreted by
this Court, it must give way." 8 USCMA at 160, 23 CMR at 384. Not a shred of legis-
lative history is cited to support this statement, and none exists. Through repeated re-
enactments of the Articles of War and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, while the
prolonged absence rule in the manuals for courts-martial remained unchanged, Congress
may be presumed to have acquiesced in, or even adopted, the rule. At any rate, the rule
is widely known, and since there is no evidence of legislative disfavor, at the very least
it cannot be held to be contrary to the Code. See, for example, the following statement
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law-formation by the judiciary that one is almost tempted to say that it
represents, not the law, but merely a temporary judicial aberration, and
that the tradition-laden prolonged absence rule is still good law, although
for the time being in eclipse.
Lower military courts are, of course, compelled to follow Cothern.
Whether it will be followed by other courts not in the military justice
system cannot be foretold at this time. For example, will it commend
itself to state courts reviewing national guard courts-martial decisions? n1
There are no decisions on this yet. Likewise, will federal courts follow it?
Again, authority is scanty.
One case does, however, throw some light on this problem. In Mancuso
v. United States,"' the defendant was tried for harboring a deserter,
knowing him to be such. Since the elements of this crime require that
the absentee be proved to have intended to desert beyond a reasonable
doubt, it follows that this case involved the identical problem involved
in every desertion case. The defendant was convicted by the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan and, on appeal,
the conviction was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals, which
in the course of its opinion, declared:
of Professor Morgan in Hearings before A Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed
Services, U.S. Senate, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., on the UCMJ, Apr. 27, 1949, p. 37:
You will notice as you study the punitive articles that we have consolidated a
number of them in the same fashion as we have consolidated a number of other
provisions throughout the rest of the code. An example of this is the crime of de-
sertion, which is now contained in article 85. The same material was heretofore found
in Articles of War 28 and 58 and in Articles for the Government of the Navy, 4
(par. 6) and 8 (par. 21).
See also Index and Legislative History, UCMJ, at 1225.
Furthermore, there is also evidence that the prolonged absence rule was before the
congressional committees considering the draft of UCMJ at least twice. In the Index and
Legislative History, UCMJ, the following appears at HH 789, referring to whether lawyers
were needed before all general courts-martial (statement by Col. Frederick B. Wiener):
It is unnecessary because a lot of your cases that go before general courts are
really police court cases. A man goes A.W.O.L. for more than 6 months. This is
prima fade desertion and it is going to be tried by general court.
Likewise, at HH 791, this continues:
"Colonel WIENER: ... an ordinary desertion case, what is there to it?
"Mr. HARDY: How do you distinguish as to who is going to distinguish between
the ordinary desertion case and one that may be somewhat involved?
"Colonel WIENER: The staff judge advocate because before he recommends that
the case go to trial, he has seen the transcript of evidence, or it is a simple case of
putting in a report and showing the apprehension a year later."
And again, at HH 1264, there is the following:
"Mr. SMART: . . . I find that in the event of, we will say a Navy enlisted person,
if he is AWOL in excess of 10 days he goes into a straggler status and if he continues
to be AWOL for as much as 30 days he then goes into desertion and his file goes to
the Chief of the Bureau of Personnel. Is that correct, Captain Woods?
"Captain WOODS: Yes."
110 This author has previously pointed out their right to do so. See Comment, "State
Court Review of National Guard Courts-Martial and Military Board Decisions," 41
Cornell L.Q. 457 (1956).
111 162 F.2d 772 (6 Cir., 1947).
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The single circumstance that DeRocco took French leave for 178 days
would, of itself, seem sufficient evidence that he was a deserter; and, this
being known to appellant, it is clear that civilian Mancuso violated the
statute in harboring sailor DeRocco." 2
Thus, wherever else Cothern may or may not be the law, in at least one
jurisdiction it is not the law-the federal courts in the home state of the
judge who wrote the opinion.
It is worthy of note that the opinion in Cothern made no reference
to Mancuso. Had it done so, it might have explored an interesting pos-
sibility. Suppose that X was absent without leave from the service for
a prolonged period. Knowing this, Y harbored him in the City of Detroit.
Later, both were arrested, and in each case the only evidence the prosecu-
tion had to prove the intent to desert was the evidence of "prolonged"
absence. Y could be convicted of knowing that X was an absentee who
intended not to return, by a federal court, while X could not be con-
victed in military court of being an absentee who intended not to return.
Thus, under Cothern, a court-martial could not be morally certain of the
existence of a serviceman's intent, while, on the same state of facts, a
civilian jury, knowing less of the service, could be morally certain that
an accused knew for a fact that the serviceman's intent existed. A theory
which could bring about such a result can hardly justify the destruction
of precedent so old that the memory of military minds runneth not to
the contrary.
VI. CONCLUSION
Just as military law as a whole is a living law, so the law of desertion
is also based on human experience. Desertion has been a military crime
and serious problem since the time men fought with bows and arrows, a3
and it will continue to be one when interplanetary travel is commonplace.
It has been distinguished since ancient times from absence without leave
by reason of the difference of intent involved." 4
The prolonged absence rule has been a part of the law of desertion
since before court-martial records were kept." It has been used "time
out of mind" by military courts because, based on human experience
over centuries of time, it is an accurate reflection of the actual intent of
the accused. It could not have existed so long unless it had stood the test
12 Id. at 773.
113 See the Case of Soldiers, supra note 242; King v. Dale, 3 Mod. 124, 87 Eng. Rep.
80 (1687), aff'd, 2 Show. 511, 89 Eng. Rep. 1071 (1688); and Green, "Review of Avins,
The Law of AWOL," 56 Mich. L. Rev. 833 (1958).
1"4 Bruce, The Institutions of Military Law 237 (1717).
115 judge Latimer declared in Cothern that this was "a rule which is founded on good
sense and logic and has long enjoyed approval in military forums." 8 USCMA at 161-62,
23 CMR 385-86. If anything, it seems that this characterization is overly conservative.
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of human experience well. A rule which is so firmly rooted in human
experience cannot be brushed aside by any passing theory. The repetition
of such experience stands as a perpetual protest against any such theory,
however well refined its logic. So long as human behavior and human
motives remain basically the same, the rules of the military law must
remain basically the same.
Some day, a court-martial will face a case of a serviceman accused
of deserting his spaceship. The court will probably consider whether he
left his spacesult on the ship, whether travel to another planet is travel
for a considerable distance, and similar issues. It is predicted, however,
that the most important issue will still be, whether his absence was "much
prolonged."
